Privatize, Privatize, Privatize!

Filed Under (Environmental Policy, Finance, Other Topics, U.S. Fiscal Policy) by Don Fullerton on Apr 6, 2012

Many advocates of small government have many ideas for how to move activities out of the public sector and into the private sector.  Social Security can be privatized, using fully-funded private retirement investment accounts.  Education can be privatized, with vouchers that can be used by parents to choose the best private school or charter school.  All could save money for the federal budget, by taking advantage of the more efficient operations of the private sector.

In this blog, I’ll describe my new idea for privatization.  Why not privatize the military!  Many rich Republicans want more military spending, and I can imagine that they might well be willing to pay for it.   Why not let them?  Now, they are probably not willing to simply donate money to the federal government, with no recognition, nor any private return on their investment.  But, we could provide the same kind of naming rights as many private operations: FedEx Field is the home of the Washington Redskins, because FedEx paid for the naming rights and they get PR advantages of doing so.  The name of the business school at the University of Texas is the “McCombs School of business”, because Red McCombs paid for the naming rights, and he gets PR advantages of doing so.  The J. Paul Getty Museum is the name of a major art museum in Los Angeles, presumably because somebody in the Getty family or foundation paid for the naming rights and gets PR advantages of doing so.

So, the idea is to write the name of any major donor on any piece of military equipment for which that donor covers at least half the cost.  Pay for half a tank, and it will be the “Your Name Here” Army Battle Tank, with the name engraved on the equipment.  You can even visit it, at certain times of year under certain conditions, and have your picture taken with it.  If you are willing to pay a little more, half the cost of a cruise missile, you can have your name on that instead.

Now I’m not suggesting that the donor ought to be allowed to decide when to push the button.  Nor even make any decisions at all.  The payment is just to help out the U.S. Federal Budget deficit, with recognition for doing so.  I’d bet that a good number of millionaires would really be willing to pay, for that kind of prestige.  It might even be greater recognition if the missile were actually used!  The well-heeled U.S. businessman might even get more U.S. business activity, after the newspaper announces that the “Your Name Here” cruise missile was launched at Tehran, killing 137 innocent civilians, but successfully deterring the Iranian government from pursuing a nuclear weapon that might kill even more.

Fiscal Sustainability AND Retirement Security: A Reform Proposal for the Illinois State Universities Retirement System (SURS)

Filed Under (Retirement Policy, U.S. Fiscal Policy) by Jeffrey Brown on Feb 9, 2012

I have released a paper today that proposes a new plan for the State Universities Retirement System.  Co-authored with Robert Rich, the Director of IGPA, the paper proposes a hybrid system that would be partially funded by both workers and universities. It contains several components that reflect some of the ideas that have been publicly discussed by state leaders in recent weeks.

 The proposal has four basic components: 

1) Create a new hybrid retirement system for new employees that would combine a scaled-down version of the existing SURS defined benefit plan with a new defined contribution plan that would include contributions from both employee and employer; 

2) Peg the SURS “Effective Rate of Interest” to market rates; 

3) Redistribute the SURS funding burden to include a modest increase in employee contributions and new direct contributions from universities, thereby reducing state government’s burden on state government; and

4) Align pension vesting rules with the private sector, which would decrease the years new employees hired after January 1, 2011 would need to work for their pension benefit to be vested.

The plan is intended to substantially reduce state expenditures on public pensions, while still providing a reasonable source of secure retirement income to university employees. 

Click here to read the full paper.

What do Newt Gingrich and Public Pension Accountants Have in Common? A Belief in a Free Lunch

Filed Under (Finance, Retirement Policy, U.S. Fiscal Policy) by Jeffrey Brown on Jan 10, 2012

Given that current Presidential candidate and former House Speaker Newt Gingrich has long been an outspoken critic of government bureaucrats, it may surprise readers to learn that his Social Security reform plan shares an intellectual flaw with public pension accounting.   Namely, a belief in a “free lunch” from the stock market.

Let me explain.  It is widely understood that the U.S. stock market has performed quite well over long time horizons in comparison with other assets, such as bonds.  Nearly all economists agree that the reason stocks have higher expected returns is because stocks are riskier.  Investors need to be compensated for bearing this extra risk.

Most people intuitively understand that stocks are inherently risky, especially after they have witnessed the volatility of the past few years.  On the other hand, many people mistakenly believe that stocks are not risky as long as one is willing to hold them long enough.

This is a great fallacy, and acting upon it is financially reckless.   While there is a long-standing debate in the economics literature about whether stock returns are “mean-reverting” (i.e., somewhat less risky) in the long-run, no serious financial economist would ever suggest that the risk of stocks is zero, even at an infinitely long time horizon.

What does all this have to do with Newt Gingrich and public pension accounting?

Gingrich has offered up a Social Security reform plan that would replace the existing system with a system of personal retirement accounts.  There are many reasons to like personal retirement accounts.  But the most important thing to understand about personal retirement accounts is that they are NOT a substitute for raising revenue or cutting benefit growth to restore fiscal sanity to Social Security.  Newt and his advisors mistakenly think they are.

Gingrich’s campaign policy white paper extols a central virtue of the Chilean system and the old Ryan-Sunnunu reform option by noting that “the government guarantees that all workers with personal accounts will receive at least as much in retirement as they would under the current Social Security system” (emphasis added).

It is the guarantee that is problematic.  Newt seems to believe – in the face of all theory and evidence to the contrary – that a multi-trillion dollar shortfall in the Social Security system can be eliminated by investing contributions in stocks.  He is so confident that it will work, that he is willing to guarantee the return required to provide the same benefits as under the current Social Security formula.

This is a recipe for fiscal disaster.  As has been noted by numerous economists – including a number of pro-accounts conservative economists – a government guarantee of investment returns imposes a potentially enormous unfunded contingent liability on taxpayers.  To paraphrase a quip I once heard:  rather than reducing our entitlement state, Newt Gingrich appears content to become the portfolio manager for the entitlement state.

But Newt Gingrich has plenty of company.  Government accounting standards for public pension plans allow public sector DB plans to engage in this same economic deception.  And, ironically from a political perspective, this approach is eagerly defended by liberal think tanks and labor unions – strange intellectual bedfellows for candidate Gingrich - who want to hide the true cost of public sector pensions.

Let’s take my state of Illinois, home to three of the ten worst funded public pension plans in the nation.  Reform efforts here are severely hampered by the existence of a state constitutional guarantee against the impairment of retirement benefits for public workers.  Newt proposes providing similar guarantees to Social Security recipients.

As I have written elsewhere, the Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) standards allow states and localities to assume they will benefit from the high returns of having part of their portfolio invested in equities, without accounting for the increased risk.  This allows public pensions to hide the true cost of public pensions from taxpayers, contributing to the massive pension funding crisis which we now face in the U.S.

Newt’s plan and GASB rules are both the direct result of a failure to accurately account for risk when valuing financial guarantees.

Taxpayers are not well-served by government accounting and budget-scoring rules that allow politicians to grow government without being honest about how we will pay for it.  The public should insist that government guarantees be accounted for accurately and honestly.

In the meantime, I look forward to seeing the mental gymnastics performed by both liberal and conservative pundits who try to defend one position while criticizing the other.

Social Security Funding

Filed Under (Finance, U.S. Fiscal Policy) by Don Fullerton on Dec 30, 2011

Here is an interesting article, in the Washington Post, entitled “Payroll tax cut raises worries about Social Security’s future funding“.  It points out that the recent payroll tax cuts are intended for short term stimulus, but they muck with the way that social security benefits are funded.  Instead of coming frm payroll taxes, that money now will haveto come from general revenue. 

As it points out: “For the first time in the program’s history, tens of billions of dollars from the government’s general pool of revenue are being funneled to the Social Security trust fund to make up for the revenue lost to the tax cut. Roughly $110 billion will be automatically shifted from the Treasury to the trust fund to cover this year’s cut, according to the Social Security Board of Trustees. An additional $19 billion, it is estimated, will be necessary to pay for the two-month extension.” 

As it goes on to say, “The payroll tax cut changes that. Instead being a protected program with its own stream of funding, Social Security, by taking money from general revenue, becomes more akin to other government initiatives such as Pentagon spending or clean-air regulation — programs that rely on income taxes and political jockeying for support.”

The WSJ is “Wrong”: The U.S. is NOT a Net Exporter of Petroleum

Filed Under (Environmental Policy, Finance, Other Topics, U.S. Fiscal Policy) by Don Fullerton on Dec 2, 2011

Just a couple days ago, the Wall Street Journal reported that “U.S. exports of gasoline, diesel and other oil-based fuels are soaring, putting the nation on track to be a net exporter of petroleum products in 2011 for the first time in 62 years.”  Taken literally, this fact is strictly “correct”, but it is misleading.  It is therefore very poor reporting.  The authors either don’t understand the words they use, or they are deliberately trying to mislead readers.

The reason it is misleading is because the article implies the U.S. is headed toward “energy independence”, and that implication is wrong.  It goes on to say:  “As recently as 2005, the U.S. imported nearly 900 million barrels more of petroleum products than it exported.  Since then the deficit has been steadily shrinking until finally disappearing last fall, and analysts say the country will not lose its ‘net exporter’ tag anytime soon.”  That statement and several expert quotes in the article clearly imply the U.S. is headed toward “energy independence”.   

Strictly speaking, the WSJ is correct that the U.S. exports more “petroleum products” than it imports, … but “petroleum products” do not include crude oil!!  “Petroleum products” include only refined products like gasoline, diesel fuel, or jet fuel.  The implication is only that the U.S. has a large refinery capacity!

The U.S. is a huge net importer of crude oil, and a huge net importer of all “crude oil and petroleum products” taken together, as you can see from the chart  below (provided by the U.S. Energy Information Administration).   In other words, we import boatloads of crude oil, we refine it, and then we export slightly more refined petroleum products than we import of refined petroleum products.  Big deal.

If the WSJ reporters knew what they were talking about, or if they were not trying to mislead readers, then they should have just stated that the U.S. is a huge net importer of all “crude oil and petroleum products” taken together.  They didn’t.  That is why I conclude they do not understand the point, or that they are trying to misrepresent it. Neither conclusion is good for the Wall Street Journal.

They are simply wrong when they say:  “The reversal raises the prospect of the U.S. becoming a major provider of various types of energy to the rest of the world, a status that was once virtually unthinkable.”  Just look at the figure!

 

A Look at Herman Cain’s 999 Tax Plan

Filed Under (Finance, Other Topics, U.S. Fiscal Policy) by Don Fullerton on Oct 21, 2011

The point of this blog is to inject some substance into discussion of Presidential candidates. To see the problem, consider what I wrote on my facebook page: “In an airport for an hour yesterday, we could not avoid hearing CNN talk about the upcoming presidential debate. For the entire hour, we heard only comments like: Perry needs to come out swinging; or, ‘Is Cain a viable candidate?’; or, Bachmann has really fallen in the polls; or, ‘This now boils down to a two-man race’, followed immediately by the wisdom that ‘Yes, but we don’t know yet who the two men are.’  What inanity! It is JUST a horse race! Not a single comment during the entire hour had anything whatever to do with any substantial issue of policy. Is this all we get?”

There must be more to consider, in this important decision.  So, I started by looking at Herman Cain’s 999 tax reform plan.  See more at his website, with the key bullets in the insert below. 

Bear in mind that I’m a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Treasury (1985-87), so I worked hard on President Reagan’s successful “Tax Reform Act of 1986” to lower the rates and broaden the base.  Since 1986, however, Congress has managed to reintroduce plenty of new deductions and tax breaks, while raising the rate.  Maybe it’s time to do something again!

Cain’s proposal has a lot of similarities to the 1986 reform, if perhaps more extreme.  It is meant to be revenue neutral, raising the same total tax.  It would eliminate virtually ALL deductions, like mortgage interest paid, and it would cut rates drastically.  It would eliminate the income tax as we know it, and introduce a national sales tax (or value added tax).   What about the accuracy of Cain’s claims below?  By reducing rates drastically, this proposal probably WOULD reduce the distorting effects of taxation by reducing the interference of taxes in the productive activities of workers and business – what economists call “deadweight loss”.  For similar reasons, it probably would provide greater incentive for work and investment, and therefore probably provide some stimulus to growth.  That’s all for the good.

However, ANY tax reform plan of ANY politician EVER, no matter what motivation, will always have two effects to watch out for.  First, any tax reform will always raise taxes on some taxpayers and reduce taxes for others.  It will have distributional effects worth analyzing.  Second, it will therefore create disruptions and reallocations.  Activities to pay additional tax may shrink – laying off workers who may remain unemployed for some time until they can re-train and find work in other activities that now face lower tax rates and hope to expand.  That is, for only one example, the Cain plan might hurt homeowners and homeownership by eliminating the mortgage interest deduction.  With such pervasive changes, however, the disruptions will be widespread and costly in themselves.

Finally, for now, note the point about distributional effects.  Nothing in any of Cain’s bullets says anything whatever about distributional effects.   I’m afraid this point is the Achilles heel of Cain’s 999 plan.  According to the non-partisan Tax Policy Center, Cain’s plan will greatly reduce taxes of those with the highest incomes and raise total taxes on those with low incomes.  It is ‘regressive’.  And you don’t even need to read the TPC analysis to know this is true.  Cain’s plan cuts the top personal rate from 35% to 9%.  There is no amount of tax-base broadening for those high income taxpayers that can get back the same tax revenue from them.  And currently those with the least income pay no Federal tax at all.   Under Cain’s plan, everybody will pay the 9% sales tax, on everything they buy.  Moreover, if those low-income individuals are working, they will probably bear some additional burden of the 9% business tax that applies to all profits AND wages paid: it applies to all sales revenue minus purchases and capital investment, not subtracting wages paid to workers.

I’d personally favor another revenue-neutral reform like the TRA of 1986, one that lowers the rates and broadens the base.  Such a reform would undoubtedly cause some disruptions and adjustments costs.  And it would help some while hurting others.  But perhaps it could be designed in a way that also tries to be distributionally neutral, not adding tax burdens on those least fortunate while cutting taxes on those already doing well.

Performance Incentives for Higher Education: You Get What You Pay For

Filed Under (Other Topics) by Nolan Miller on Oct 12, 2011

The Daily Illini ran a story today about a change to the way public universities will be funded in the future.  This year’s higher education bill, HB 1503, contains provisions instructing the Illinois Board of Higher Education to come up with performance measures that will be used, in part, as a basis for funding public colleges and universities in the state.  Let me begin by saying that, in general, holding government bodies accountable for their performance is a good idea.  The people of the state have a right to know that their money is being well spent.  I encourage the adoption of performance measures in all areas of public expenditure.

Having said that, I encourage (e.g., warn) the Illinois Board of Higher Education to keep in mind that when you pay someone to do something, they’re going to do exactly that.  So, you need to be careful what wish for.  If you increase a school’s funding when they increase their graduation rate, you should expect them to increase their graduation rate, and in many cases they’ll adopt the lowest-cost approach to doing so.  Sure, they may increase advising and keep closer tabs on students as they work their way through their educational careers.  That would be great.  But, they might also be more lenient in counting credits toward graduation, lowering their standards, or they might be more reluctant to admit students who seem unlikely to graduate on time, decreasing access.  While increasing advising effort costs money, relaxing standards and not admitting students who are unlikely to graduate (assuming there is another student waiting to take his place) are relatively costless.  We should not be surprised if, in the face of increased incentive, public universities make use of the latter two tools to increase graduation rates, because we paid them to do it.

To be sure, legislators and the IBHE are aware of these possibilities.  In fact, the bill suggests that there should be both overall performance measures (e.g., graduation rates) as well as measures that look at how well the school serves at-risk students.  However, incentives are complicated, so-much-so that social scientists have a name for what happens when they go awry.  We call it the “Law of Unintended Consequences.”  Further, there is increasing evidence that when you create explicit, monetary incentives to do a thing, you crowd out intrinsic incentives.  So, while you may have student advisors who today go the extra mile to get a student through to graduation out of a sense of altruism or duty, once you put a price on performance, this sense of duty seems to take a back seat.  People start to say “if I go the extra mile to help this student, it isn’t going to affect our overall graduation rate, which is what the state really cares about, so why bother.”  In an environment where people generally do their jobs, and do them well, because it is the right thing to do, putting a price tag on things can significantly reduce their intrinsic motivation.

The next point of concern comes from the funding structure.  It is unclear whether the incentive payments will be “new” money in addition to that already allocated to public colleges and universities, or whether it will be a reallocation of current money.  Much ado is made regarding government funding from the idea that people can do more with less.  We often hear cries to reduce “waste, fraud and abuse.”  But we need to keep in mind that public colleges and universities in Illinois have just been through a years-long belt-tightening process.  The easy cuts have already been cut.  Trying to squeeze the incentive payments within current budgetary allocations encourages “robbing Peter to pay Paul,” pulling resources away from other functions in order to meet performance goals, and the tighter the budget gets the more schools will be tempted to increase their performance scores through the cheapest way possible (i.e., lowering standards) rather than through the “right” way (i.e., increasing learning).

Finally, in setting up the pool of money available for performance bonuses, the IBHE needs to be careful not to exacerbate competition between public schools.  If the bonus pool is fixed and awarded to schools based on how well they meet performance goals, this may increase incentives to compete with other public schools.  Perhaps they will increase marketing expenditures in order to attract better students.  However, if all public schools do this, in the end you might have a lot of money going to marketing firms that would otherwise go to student services, and students more-or-less ending up in the same places they would have gone before.  Or, schools may spend money on improving student services such as the quality of the gym and/or the dorms, which make students happy but do not contribute to educational attainment.  The stronger the incentives offered by the new system, the more temptation there will be to engage in expenditures of this sort.  If competitive incentives are strong enough, forcing public schools in Illinois to compete more intensively over students may actually leave less money available for education and reduce overall attainment.  More unintended consequences.

Let me finish by saying that I’m not necessarily against performance incentives. But, incentives are complicated things, and the unintended consequences of incentive payments are often as important, if not more so, than the intended ones.  Designing incentive schemes that induce the behavior you want without encouraging the behavior you don’t want is a very difficult task.  I hope the IBHE is up to it.

What is the meaning of a budget number?

Filed Under (Environmental Policy, Retirement Policy, U.S. Fiscal Policy) by Don Fullerton on Oct 7, 2011

With all the argument in Washington about how to balance the budget, a reminder is worthwhile that none of these numbers make any sense at all!  What “should” be the meaning of the government budget?  And, does any number provided by anybody actually have that meaning?

In general, a budget deficit is supposed to mean that one’s current consumption exceeds income, which would indicate a decrease in wealth.  Indeed, that’s the problem with a deficit – drawing down our wealth (which could even turn from positive to negative!).  The U.S. Federal budget numbers fail to provide such a meaning, for several reasons.

First, the Federal budget includes ALL spending, not just consumption.  Some of that spending is actually investment, such as new spending on buildings, bridges, roads, airplanes, and any long-lived military equipment.  The budget does not show the breakdown between what we really use up this year, and what spending is really investing in the future.

Second, Social Security is “off-budget”, unless you are looking at a unified budget.  Okay, I said that in a way that is intentionally confusing!  The basic problem here is that social security is SUPPOSED to run a surplus, so that we can set aside some funds from those now working to pay them when they are retired.  If it does not run a surplus to save for the retirement of the baby boom generation, then we’ll be in big trouble when the baby boom generation retires!  The current social security surplus is too small for that.  Then, however, the big problem is that the unified budget mixes the social security budget with the rest of federal spending.  So when you see a deficit in that account, it’s really worse than it looks, because it includes the small social security SURPLUS that’s already not a big enough surplus for social security to break even!

Third, the U.S. Federal Budget is confusing about what is a “Tax Expenditure” and what is government “Spending”.  A tax expenditure is really ‘spending via tax break’, as when a taxpayer gets a special credit or deduction for doing some particular activity.  The Congress could instead have accomplished the exact same thing by an ACTUAL spending program, providing subsidy to the same set of eligible individuals for doing the exact same activity.  So it really does not make much sense to say you want to cut spending and not raise taxes, because eliminating one of those tax breaks is really the same as eliminating an equivalent spending program.

Fourth, a Federal “mandate” might require a certain kind of spending by a firm.  To take a simple example, suppose some safety regulation requires construction firms to provide a hard hat to all workers.  That’s really equivalent to a tax on that firm, equal to the amount they have to spend on hard hats, where the revenue of that “tax” is spend by government on the provision of hard hats.  But then the problem is that mandates are so pervasive.  Some ‘true’ measure of the size of government would be HUGE, if we counted the dollar cost of all mandates as a “tax”, as if it were in the government budget.

Proposed GASB Pension Discounting Standards: Even Worse than Before?

Filed Under (Finance, Retirement Policy, U.S. Fiscal Policy) by Jeffrey Brown on Oct 2, 2011

I have written on this blog before about the Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) rules that allow public pension plans to discount their liabilities using the expected return on plan assets.  This is no small technical matter … discounting in this way has the effect of dramatically understating the true economic value of the unfunded liabilities of public pension liabilities.  This single accounting issue may understate the magnitude of the public pension funding problem by trillions of dollars!

GASB has issued proposed new standards and are in the process of accepting comments from the public.  I submitted my comments last week, and thought I would post a few excerpts here.

“As members of the GASB Board may already know, I have been critical of existing GASB guidelines for the computation of public pension liabilities.  I have a paper in the May 2009 American Economic Review (co-authored with David Wilcox of the Federal Reserve Board) in which we explain the basic economic rationale for the appropriate choice of a discount rate.  Economic and financial theory is very clear that the choice of a discount rate depends on the risk of the cash flows being discounted

This is true regardless of whether those cash flows are positive or negative, and whether they are being generated by public institutions, private institutions, or individuals.  There is absolutely no economic or financial basis for discounting one set of cash flows based on the risk of a completely different set of cash flows.  In other words, there is no logic whatsoever for discounting pension liabilities based on the risk of the pension plan assets

A simple analogy illustrates this point.  Suppose that at 9 a.m. on January 1, I borrow $100,000 for one year from a bank at an interest rate of 5 percent.  I immediately invest the full amount in a diversified portfolio of risky assets (such as stocks and bonds) that has an “expected return” of 8 percent.  By the time I have completed this transaction at 9:05 a.m. on January 1, how much do I owe the bank?  Naturally, I still owe them $100,000 (ignoring the 5 minutes’ worth of interest).  At this point, I have not changed by net worth at all.  All I have changed is my risk exposure. 

Suppose, however, that I follow GASB-like accounting rules to calculate my net worth.  Because the expected return on my portfolio is 8 percent, I can use this to discount the $105,000 (principal plus 5 percent interest) that I will owe in one year (December 31).  By this calculation, I would now only value the future liability as $97,222.22 (=$105,000 / 1.08), making it appear as if I have created $2,777.78 of wealth out of thin air.    

Of course, if I tried to tell my lender at 9:05 a.m. on January 1 – just 5 minutes after closing the loan – that they should allow me to give them $97,222.22 and cancel my $100,000 debt, they would look at me with great puzzlement!  And for good reason – I owe them $100,000 now, or $105,000 in one year, regardless of what I do with the funds in the interim!  The transaction just described is absurd from the financial perspective.  But as illogical as it seems, this approach closely mirrors the approach that has been taken by GASB in the past and that is still embedded in the proposed new public pension accounting guidelines.

The fundamental problem is that the use of “expected returns” as a discount rate is a largely a meaningless concept unless it is also accompanied by a discussion of, and accounting for, the accompanying risk.  

The most straightforward way to do this is to discount pension liabilities based on the risk characteristics of the pension cash flows.  For example, for the accumulated pension obligation (ABO) for a public pension in a state with strong constitutional guarantees against the impairment of retirement benefits, it would be appropriate to use a rate close to the risk-free rate.  In other cases – such as states where pension benefits can be easily changed by the legislature and where the likelihood of change is correlated with broader economic activity – a higher discount rate should be used.  In either case, what must determine the discount rate is the risk profile of the liabilities and NOT the expected return on plan assets.

In the exposure draft for the new rules, GASB seeks to replace the “expected return on plan assets” discount rate with a “blended rate.”  This blended rate is a combination of the expected return on plan assets for the funded portion of the liability and a muni-bond index for the unfunded portion.  Unfortunately, there is no theoretically coherent rationale for the proposed approach.  Indeed, though this approach could be viewed by some as a “compromise,” the result produces an even less coherent outcome than existing policy. 

There are several fatal flaws to the proposed approach, including:

1. There is no clear question to which the proposed measure is the right answer.  Indeed, it is difficult to think of any outcome of interest that is meaningfully described by the output of a cash flow discounting exercise that uses the blended rate as described in the proposed rules.

2. Funded status is not a sufficient measure of the risk of pension liabilities.  To be sure, it may be one such factor – at least insofar as one believes that participants in underfunded pensions are more likely to experience future benefit reductions – but it is far from a sufficient statistic.  Therefore, it is an insufficient basis on which to evaluate the risk of the liabilities. 

3. Even if funded status were a sufficient measure of risk (which it is not), the proposed GASB rules have blended the discount rates in the wrong proportions.  If funded benefits are less risky than unfunded benefits, then the funded benefits should be discounted at a lower rate, and the unfunded ones that should be discounted at a higher rate.  The proposed GASB rules turn this logic on its head, and the result is inconsistent with accepted procedures for risk adjustment.

 4. Even if one wished to calculated a blended rate to account for differential risk based on funding status, the “expected return on plan assets” is not the right rate to use for the “risky” portion of benefits — unless the risk of the liabilities just so happens to correspond exactly to the risk of the asset portfolio, which is highly unlikely.  For example, if  liabilities are discounted using the expected return on a 60/40 equity/bond portfolio, this is equivalent to saying that the distribution of benefit payments to DB pension participants is just as risky as investing in a 60/40 portfolio.  I suspect that few DB plan sponsors intend for their plans to be so risky, and fewer participants believe that their public pension is intended to be so uncertain.

 5. The proposed rules provide an unattractive and dangerous incentive for plan sponsors to take on more investment risk than is optimal.  If plan sponsors invest in a risker portfolio, they will then be able to “justify” a higher expected return under GASB rules.  Indeed when they are permitted to use a higher expected return, they can show a larger share of their liabilities as being “funded.”  This, in turn, also reduces the fraction of their liabilities that will then be discounted using the muni-bond index.  In short, public pensions may be tempted to invest in a riskier asset portfolio in an attempt to shrink the reported size of their unfunded liabilities.    

6. There is a good conceptual argument for using state or municipality’s bond returns as a discount rate for a public entity’s pension liabilities, at least to the extent that pension obligations and bond obligations bear comparable credit risk.  However, this rate should reflect the risk of that particular state or municipality, rather than some aggregate index.  More generally, different states and municipalities should use different discount rates when the risks of their pension obligations differ.      

Because of these and other flaws, I believe it would be a mistake to adopt GASB’s the new proposed discounting rules.  Instead, GASB should adopt standards that based discount rates on the risk of the liabilities.”

 

Closing the Barn Door after the Horses Escape

Filed Under (Finance, Other Topics, U.S. Fiscal Policy) by Don Fullerton on Sep 2, 2011

The New York Times today says that the Federal Housing Finance Agency is set to sue major U.S. banks such as Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, and Deutsche Bank, among others.  The U.S. government argues that the banks sold packaged mortgages as securities to investors while ignoring evidence that the homeowners’ incomes were inflated or falsified.  That is, the banks failed to perform the due diligence required under securities law.  When many of those homeowners were unable to pay their mortgages, the securities backed by the mortgages tanked.  Housing and financial crises ensued.

Kinda late, isn’t it?  Well, certainly it’s too late this time, to prevent the housing and financial crises of the past few years.  What is the point of the suit, then?  Does the U.S. Federal government really need the money that they can get from these banks, as damages, and will they give it back to all of us who lost money during those years?  The U.S. might sue for around a billion dollars, which is peanuts these days.  Divided by 333 million Americans, that would be about three dollars each.  Why bother?

An important conceptual point here is the difference between ex post liability (after the fact) and ex ante incentives (beforehand).   The point of this suit is not to collect a billion dollars after the fact, although arguments are made about the fairness of those liable to pay for damages.  Rather, the point is to provide the proper incentives to private companies before the next time.  To a private company, a billion dollars really is a lot of money.  If they have to worry about the loss of a billion dollars, for ignoring their legal responsibilities, then maybe next time they’ll be more careful to follow the law.

Government regulation can take alternative forms.  One alternative is to send auditors and inspectors into every bank, every day, to check what they are doing.  That would be very expensive.  A cheaper alternative is to let the banks decide for themselves if they are exercising due diligence, but with the “threat” hanging over their head that they might get sued if they don’t.