What is that, a gastrointestinal disorder? No, it’s the title of one of my recent research papers (joint with Dan Karney and Kathy Baylis) about unilateral efforts to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG). When worldwide agreement is not possible, then the question is whether GHG abatement policy might be implemented by only one country, or bloc of countries (or region or sector). The fear of any one country or bloc is that they would only raise their own cost of production, make themselves less competitive, and lose business to firms in other countries that may increase production and emissions. When only one country limits their emissions, any positive effect on emissions elsewhere is called “leakage”.
Yes, that’s a word in economics, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leakage .
In efforts to “abate” or to reduce GHG emissions, the fear of lost business has pretty much deterred any attempt at unilateral climate policy. That positive leakage might be called a “terms of trade effect” (TTE), because unilateral policy raises the price of exports and reduces the price of imports. But our recent research paper points out a major effect that could offset part of that positive leakage. The “negative leakage” term in the equation might be called an “abatement resource effect” (ARE). That is, one additional thing happening is that the domestic firms face higher costs of their emissions, and so they want to substitute away from GHG emissions and instead use other resources for abatement – such as windmills, solar cells, energy efficient machinery, hybrids, electric cars, and even “carbon capture and sequestration” (CCS). Thus they have at least SOME incentive to draw resources AWAY from other sectors or other countries. If that effect is large, the result might shrink those other sectors’ operations overall, and thus possibly SHRINK emissions elsewhere.
I don’t mean to oversell this idea, because it probably does not completely offset the usual positive “terms of trade effect”. But in some circumstances it COULD be large, and it COULD result in net negative leakage. The best example is probably to think about a tax or permit price for carbon emissions only in the electricity generating sector, within one country. For simplicity, suppose there’s no trade with any other countries, so the only choice for consumers in this country is how much to spend on “electricity” and how much to spend on “all other goods”. Demand for electricity is usually thought to be inelastic, which means consumers buy almost the same amount even as the price rises. If firms need to produce almost as much electricity, while substantially reducing their GHG emissions, they must invest a lot of labor AND capital into windmills, solar panels, and CCS. With any given total number of workers and investment dollars in the economy, then fewer resources are used to produce “all other goods”.
The ability of consumers to substitute between the two goods (electricity vs “all other”) is called the “elasticity of substitution in utility.” The ability of firms to substitute between GHG emissions and those OTHER inputs is called the “elasticity of substitution in production”. If the former is bigger than the latter, then net leakage is positive. If the latter is bigger than the former, then net leakage can be negative.
Okay, too technical. But the point is that other researchers have missed this “abatement resource effect” and overstated the likely positive effect on leakage. And that omission has led to overstated fears about the bad effects of unilateral carbon policy. What we show is that those fears are overstated, in some cases, where leakage may not be that bad. With some concentration on those favorable cases, one country might be able to undertake some good for the world without fear that they just lose business to other sectors.